Tuesday 16 September 2014

Reading Dreze and Sen: 5 – Integrating Growth and Development

The impact that economic growth has on the lives of people depends on a) income distribution, but also on b) the use made of public revenue generated by economic growth.

For example, the fact that India spends only 1.2% of its GDP on healthcare and China devotes 2.7% is directly relevant to the greater health achievements of China vis-à-vis India. Because of low allocation to public healthcare, many poor people across India are forced to rely on private doctors. Why is that so wrong? First, many private doctors have little or no medical training. Second, patients know very little about diseases, medicines required or indeed why, the possibility of defrauding is huge [in absence of an alternative public healthcare to which they can go to for assistance or advice]. India has started to rely on private healthcare without developing solid public healthcare facilities. In doing this, India is proceeding on a path different from every country that has made a successful health transition [e.g. Britain, Japan, China, Brazil, South Korea, Costa Rica]. All these countries first developed a well-functioning public healthcare system and only then encouraged private health care facilities as auxiliaries. By allocating more of the public revenue generated by economic growth to promoting healthcare, India could more greatly enhance the living conditions of its citizens. Whether growth facilitates development in terms of enhancing the living conditions of people depends on what is done with the public revenue that is generated by growth.

Moreover, while we must recognize the role of growth in facilitating development (in the sense of improving human lives), we also need to recognize that the advancement of human capabilities (through healthcare, education etc) also, in turn, influences the growth possibilities of a country. The state can play a constructive role in developing these human capabilities.

Before the economic reforms in the 1990s, India faced two major failures. First, it was failing to tap the constructive role of the market (especially in terms of promoting initiative, efficiency and coordinating complex economic operations). India’s ‘Licence Raj’ system had made it necessary to take government permissions for private initiatives and this made economic enterprise very difficult; economic enterprise was put at the mercy of bureaucrats. This stifled initiative and nurtured corruption. This failure has been partially remedied in the post-reform period. Arbitrary controls have been removed and there is now a greater openness to international trade – both of which have helped India to achieve a solid basis for high rates of economic growth. Nevertheless, there is more to be done both in terms of removing/simplifying counterproductive regulations and ensuring that regulation, where necessary, is well-aimed.

But there was another, second failure that India needed to address i.e. its failure to tap the constructive role of the state. Government intervention in the pre-reform period was excessive and of a restricting kind. But there were huge areas of activity where it could have engaged in constructive public action which could have achieved a lot. For example, the state could’ve been used to remedy India’s under-developed physical (power, water, roads, rails) and social infrastructure (hospitals, schools etc) and to build a functioning system of accountable public services. The reforms of the '90s have done little to remedy this second failure.

Despite its post-reform increase in growth rates, the benefits of this growth are very unequally shared. Poverty rates have decreased, but a lot more could have been achieved had the distributional side (including provision of essential services) got more attention. India’s failures are huge in terms of widespread undernourishment in general and child nourishment in particular. Other big failures include the lack of provision of healthcare to the bulk of the population and a quarter of the population remaining effectively illiterate.

The two main problems facing the Indian economy are 1) removing the disparities that divide the country into the privileged and the rest while continuing economic growth and 2) bringing more accountability into the running of the economy, especially in the delivery of public services and the operation of the public sector. Both these problems stifle India’s social and economic progress and remain essential parts of the unfinished agenda of growth and development of India. 



[The purpose of the ‘Reading Dreze and Sen’ series of blogs is to briefly summarise some of the arguments given by Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen in their book ‘An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions’. The arguments are of the authors alone and the blogs are merely a recapitulation of them in as simple a way possible (the style is deliberately informal). The aim is to help myself to remember the details of these arguments (writing always helps!) but more importantly to hopefully trigger conversation and provoke contestation regarding the issues raised, even if on small forums like facebook :)]


Monday 8 September 2014

Reading Dreze and Sen: 4 – Why has India's economic growth only barely benefited its poor?

India’s growth has caused tremendous excitement. The living standards of the middle classes (top 20% of the population by income –or, in other words- people like you and me) have improved greatly. But the story is more complex for many others such as the riksha-wala, the domestic worker or the brick-kiln labourer. Dreze and Sen argue that India’s economic growth has barely altered their abysmal living conditions.

For example, between 1993-4 and 2009-10, the average per capita rural expenditure (average expenditure of a rural person) increased at the very very low rate of 1% per year (and even for urban areas the figure was only 2% per year). There has been a slowdown of real agricultural wages in the post-reform period[1]. The growth of real wages for other parts of the economy has also been relatively slow, especially for casual or so-called ‘unskilled’ workers. The contrast to China is striking - real wages in manufacturing in China grew at 12% per-year (!!) from 2001-10, compared with 2.5% per year in India. 

The rate of poverty decline in India has been much slower than in other developing countries as a whole in the last 20 years, despite economic growth being much faster in India. 

But why has economic growth in India led to such a small increase in the wages and incomes of the poor?

One important reason is India’s economics is propelling a ‘jobless growth’ i.e. a failure to generate employment. In India, the rapid economic growth in the last 20 years has been driven by ‘services’. And a large part of the growth in services has been heavily concentrated in skill-intensive sectors (like software development, financial services and other specialized work) rather than in the labour-intensive sectors.  This has enabled the more educated section of the workforce to earn much higher wages and salaries. But the bulk of our workforce is not  involved in services, but is instead engaged in agriculture or other sectors (this includes the ‘informal sector’ which employs 90% of our labour force). Here, wages and productivity are very low.

Dreze and Sen state that India’s lack of progress in education and healthcare also prevents people from entering and flourishing in general manufacturing jobs. The progress of living standards is extremely slow (living standards include longevity, health security, literacy, educational opportunities, child undernourishment, social status etc). For example, India has a higher proportion of undernourished children than almost any other country in the world, even after 30 years of rapid economic growth. Many countries have made huge improvements in health and nutrition status of their respective populations in a shorter time, even with lower rates of economic growth (The following blogs will say more about this).

The authors argue that for economic development to take place, India needs not just growth-friendly institutions that encourage initiative but it also needs to give a central role to education which is critical to the formation of knowledge and skills (which, in turn, is essential for the process of socio-economic development).  In short, Dreze and Sen stress that it’s essential for India to focus on developing ‘human capital’ because this is crucial for growth and development.  


[The purpose of the ‘Reading Dreze and Sen’ series of blogs is to briefly summarise some of the arguments given by Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen in their book ‘An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions’. The arguments are of the authors alone and the blogs are merely a recapitulation of them in as simple a way possible (the style is deliberately informal). The aim is to help myself to remember the details of these arguments (writing always helps!) but more importantly to hopefully trigger conversation and provoke contestation regarding the issues raised, even if on small forums like facebook :)]






[1] This picked up after the introduction of MREGA in 2006. 

Thursday 4 September 2014

Reading Dreze and Sen: 3 - A Short History of India's Economic Growth

At the time when Dreze and Sen were finishing their book, India’s growth rate had fallen to 6.2% which was considered by numerous people as a ‘dismal growth figure’. The decline from the previous years’ growth rates of 8-9% was considered alarming. But Dreze and Sen point out that during 2011-12 (when they were concluding this book), India’s growth rate was still the 2nd fastest in terms of economic growth among all the large economies in the world, trailing only behind China (which had also experienced a decline). Compared to the one-time ‘star performer in the economic field’ Brazil whose growth rate had fallen to 0.8%, India wasn’t doing too badly at all.  But, despite that caveat, Dreze and Sen admit that one needs to take the economic slowdown seriously. This is not because growth is important in itself; its because growth generates resources which allow India to a) expand individual incomes and b) utilize the public revenue to meet social commitments.

The authors go on to give a short history of India’s fast growth. When India gained independence, it moved at a slow (but steady) pace for 3 decades – it grew at 3.5% per year. This was ‘painfully slow’ for purposes of rapid development and poverty reduction. In the 1980s, however, India picked up (and grew at a 5% per year). Following the economic reforms of the early 1990s (led by Manmohan Singh, then the Finance Minister), India made faster progress and established a new norm of RAPID GROWTH. Dreze and Sen stress that the robustness of India’s high growth is undoubtedly connected to the economic reforms of the ‘90s. India hovered between 5 and 6%, went up to 7% and then even crossed 9% for several years (2005-08)!

But even after 2 decades of rapid growth, India is still one of the poorest countries of the world. India’s real income per head is still lower than most countries outside sub-Saharan Africa. As the authors point out, millions in India still lack basic requirements of satisfactory living: be it nutritional food or healthcare, decent work conditions or warm clothes in the winter. Growth alone is unlikely to end these problems, but growth does enable an easier solution to such deficiencies.

*

How did India become one of the poorest countries of the world?Dreze and Sen point out that it wasn’t always so. Adam Smith, in his book The Wealth of Nations (1776) attempted to explain the roots of India’s prosperity. When the East India Company gained its first foothold in India, India was famous of its industrial exports (their quality was apparently a cause of concern for European manufacturers!). Even a comparison of wage rates and prices indicates that the real wages of Indian labour in economically active regions were not lower- and sometimes even higher – than those received by their counterparts in many European countries.

The rapid decline of the relative position of the Indian economy took place during the British Raj (this was also recognized by Adam Smith). The decline continued throughout the 19thcentury and the first half of the 20th century. Long periods during British rule actually saw the per capita real income of India actually declining! According to a study, the annual growth rate of India per capita income was 0.1% between 1900-01 and 1946-7. The growth rate was positive, but was so only because the dismal GDP growth rate (0.9%) was countered by the low population growth rate (0.8%) which reflected the high mortality rates under British rule. 

*

Given this history, India’s post-independence growth rate of 3.5% per annum sure does seem like a positive change. But this growth rate did not bring about any major transformation in people’s living conditions. Till the 80s, there was virtually no reduction of poverty.


This is often blamed on India’s ‘socialist’ planning. Dreze and Sen, however, argue that this was not because of socialism per se, but because of the KIND of policies that India followed. India did not even follow the kind of policies found in Russia or most other Communist countries. For example, one thing that communist countries were committed to was free, universal school education. ‘socialist’ India did not go down that way! As a result, India advanced very little in providing schooling opportunities to its children. Unlike other communist countries, India saw under-allocation of public money to make the country literate. The authors point out that the implication of this – to blame the neglect of school education in India’s planning on ‘socialist planning’ absolves India of its own culpability in this mistake.Interestingly, Dreze and Sen suggest that even India’s economic planning was not very ‘socialist’. Most of the economy was firmly in the private sector and, while the government did intervene in many ways, there was no sweeping nationalization of industries and no land reforms.

Early economic planning failed ‘more completely’, say the authors, in social infrastructure and tertiary industries than in primary and secondary production. Growth rates in the primary and secondary sectors (roughly, agriculture and manufacturing, respectively) were HIGHER in the first 15 years that followed the 1st Five Year Plan (1951) than in the first 15 years post-economic reforms in 1991. The growth rate of the tertiary sector was slower in the first period, as was that of GDP. The notion that planning brought the economy to a halt in the Nehruvian years is not easy to substantiate).

The period of sustained moderate growth came to an end in the mid-60s when India was hit by the worst successive droughts and when it fought 2 costly wars with Pakistan (in 1965 and 1971). Agricultural production crashed and India’s GDP turned negative. This was also a period of significant changes in the politics of economic policy. Nehru (died in 1964) was succeeded by Indira Gandhi who politicized economics. Under her, commercial banks were nationalized (this was chosen for political reasons). Similarly, import quotas and industrial licenses were used to reward her supporters and punishing her opponents! Even the most inconsequential economic activity apparently now needed governmental approval. This had terrible effects on the economy; it a) stifled economic initiatives b) encouraged corruption and c) led to the abuse of power. People paid a huge price for all this.

Things started looking up in the 1980s. India experienced growth acceleration, which was helped by recovery of the agricultural sector. GDP rose to 5% per year in this decade. The green revolution began to show its effects – the agricultural sector grew faster than ever before (yields shot up by 30% in the ‘80s)! Agricultural wages grew, and there was a sustained decline in poverty.

However, the 1980s were also a period of fiscal deficits, trade deficits and foreign debt. This was compounded by rising oil prices and disruption of remittances from the Persian Gulf. India ran out of foreign exchange reserves. A ‘structural adjustment program’ followed under strict conditions imposed by the IMF.

After a while, the policy of cuts in public expenditure (inc social spending) gave way to gradual reforms. The GDP growth rate picked up post-1993 and continued to grow henceforth. The impact of reforms on economic growth in these years was definitely a significant achievement.


Some reforms - such as 1) greater openness to international trade 2) relaxation of internal controls  - occurred fairly early, and other occurred later. Some – such as 1) privatisation of certain public enterprises 2) extensive labour reforms 3) permissibility of FDI in specific sectors- are still being debated. Some people are frustrated by the gradualism of these reforms, but Dreze and Sen argue that these reforms do need informed public debate. Unfortunately, debate about them proceeds along ‘pro-market’ vs ‘anti-market’ lines, whereas these actually require a specific, case-by-case assessment of arguments. The case for specific reforms needs to be judged not by its impact on growth but by their impact on peoples’ lives. Dreze and Sen conclude by saying that one of the main problems with the reforms was not what they tried to do, but with what they did not even ATTEMPT to achieve. This, they say, has extended the deeper biases of the pre-reform period.


[The purpose of the ‘Reading Dreze and Sen’ series of blogs is to briefly summarise some of the arguments given by Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen in their book ‘An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions’. The arguments are of the authors alone and the articles are merely a recapitulation (in as simple a way possible). The aim is for myself to remember them (writing always helps!) as well as to get these arguments out in the public arena and mainstream. The hope is to start conversations regarding the issues raised :)]